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FORGING A DIPLOMATIC SHIELD FOR AMERICAN
SATELLITES: THE CASE FOR REEVALUATING THE 2006




T HE JANUARY 11, 2007 Chinese anti-satellite (ASAT) test
harkened the dawn of a new era in space law and interna-
tional relations, as hundreds of satellites upon which both the
United States and China rely, are now vulnerable to attack.
While the United States' 2006 National Space Policy rejects any
international space regime, this Article argues that the United
States should pursue a comprehensive ASAT test ban treaty to
protect the vulnerable satellites that coordinate all of America's
military assets. When viewed through a game theory lens, China
and the United States might militarize space, even though it is
in both of their interests not to do so, because the two countries
do not trust each other. The best way to break out of this collec-
tive action problem is to pursue an international treaty regime
banning the testing, deployment, and use of ASAT systems. Ad-
ditionally, an ASAT treaty might also break the impasse in the
United Nations Conference on Disarmament, where disagree-
ment on space disarmament has stymied talks on terrestrial stra-
tegic arms.
* J.D., Georgetown University Law Center, 2007; B.A., Yale University, 2004.
Associate, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, LLP. I would like to thank Professor
David Koplow for demanding the best from his students; I am a better writer,
advocate, and lawyer because of the time and effort David put into my
development. This article is dedicated to my father, Edward W. Walsh,
1956-2006, for being a better role model than any son could deserve. His faith
in country and God are with me today.
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ARTICLE
"This is the first real escalation in the weaponization of space that
we've seen in 20 years. It ends a long period of restraint."
-Jonathan McDowell, Harvard Astronomer
Early in the evening of January 11, 2007, the Chinese military
ushered in an explosive new chapter in the space age when it
launched a single ballistic missile from a mobile launcher near
the Xichang Space Center.2 The missile raced upward on an
intercept course with the aging Feng Yun IC (FY-1C) weather
satellite.' A roughly cube shaped satellite measuring 1.5 meters
a side,4 the FY-1C had neared the end of its operational life after
being launched in 1999 5-but it would end its career in an ex-
plosive flourish. The ASAT warhead atop the ballistic missile
fired from Xichang slammed into the FY-1C five hundred miles
above the Sichuan province, and the kinetic energy from the
warhead ripped the FY-1C apart.6 While the Chinese ASAT mis-
sile, dubbed the SC-19 by American intelligence, had been flight
tested at least twice before, the January 11 test was the first to
actually hit an orbiting satellite.7 As the shards of what was once
the FY-1C began to drift down to Earth, a shocked world pre-
pared to deal with a China capable of weaponizing space.8
I William J. Broad & David E. Sanger, Flexing Muscle, China Destroys Satellite in
Test, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2007, at Al.
2 See Craig Covault, Chinese Test Anti-Satellite Weapon, AVIATION WK. & SPACE
TECH., Jan. 17, 2007, http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewnews.html?id=1188.
3 Id. The perceived invulnerability of American space satellites stemmed from
the fact that no country had conducted an anti-satellite test in over twenty years;
the Soviet Union had conducted roughly a dozen anti-satellite tests from 1968 to
1982, and the United States had conducted experiments between 1985 and 1986.
See Broad & Sanger, supra note 1, at 1.
4 Yujie Liu et al., Fy-ic Polar Orbiting Meteorological Satellite of China: Satel-
lite, Ground System, and Preliminary Applications, Address at the 20th Asian
Conference in Kemote Sensing (Nov. 22-25, 1999), http://www.gisdevelopment.
net/aars/acrs/1999/p6/ps6211 pf.htm.
5 Theresa Hitchens et al., Chinese Anti-Satellite Weapons Test in Space is Provocative
and Irresponsible, CTR. FOR DEF. INFO., Jan. 22, 2007, http://www.cdi.org/
program/document.cfm?DocumentID=3800&StartRow=l &ListRows= 10&append
URL=&Orderby=D.DateLastUpdated&ProgramID=68&from-page=index.cfm.
6 Covault, supra note 2.
7 Michael R. Gordon & David S. Cloud, U.S. Knew of China's Missile Test, But
Kept Silent, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2007, at Al.
8 David E. Sanger & Joseph Kahn, U.S. Officials Try to Interpret China's Silence
Over Satellite, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2007, at A3 (reporting that the United States,
Canada, Japan, and Australia filed protests against the test within days); Joseph
Kahn, A New Player at Star Wars: China Shows Assertiveness in Reported Weapons Test,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2007, at A7 ("'This is the other face of China, the hard power
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The Chinese kill vehicle demonstrated its ability to hit 300 of
the 845 active satellites in space, including low-orbiting Ameri-
can reconnaissance satellites.9 The destruction of the FY-1C was
the first ASAT test since the Soviet Union"' and the United
States discontinued their ASAT programs in the 1980s. I I The
onus is now on the United States, with its previously secure
space assets suddenly in jeopardy, to develop a space policy that
maintains its military dominance and effectively counters
China's new capabilities.
Ironically, the policy-changing Chinese ASAT test came only
five months after the United States issued its first National Space
Policy in over ten. 12 The new National Space Policy stressed the
importance of independence in space policy, arguing that the
United States should "preserve its rights, capabilities, and free-
dom of action in space"13 and "oppose the development of new
legal regimes or other restrictions that seek to prohibit or limit
U.S. access to or use of space."' 4 The administration's main rea-
son for rejecting the international regulation of space weapons
was that there simply was no need to do so: since there was no
space arms race, then there was no need to engage in space
arms control. 15 The Chinese ASAT test has fundamentally
changed the implications of unfettered space activities; by de-
manding that the United States have absolute freedom to pur-
sue weapons platforms in space, the National Space Policy also
side that they usually keep well hidden,' said Chong-Pin Lin, an expert on
China's military in Taiwan. They talk more about peace and diplomacy, but the
push to develop lethal high-tech capabilities has not slowed down at all.").
9 See WilliamJ. Broad, Look Up! It's No Meteor, It's an Arms Race, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
21, 2007, at WK3; David Constantine, Moving Targets, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2007, at
WK3.
10 Fed. of Am. Scientists, Co-Orbital ASAT, http://www.fas.org/spp/guide/
russia/military/asat/coorb.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2007).
11 ALLAN S. KRAss, VERIFICATION: How MUCH IS ENOUGH? 103 (1985). The
United States flight tested a "direct-ascent" ASAT system which used a small mis-
sile launched from fighter aircraft approximately thirty times before the program
was discontinued. Id.; see alsoJurgen Scheffran, Verification and Risk for an Anti-
Satellite Weapons Ban, 17 BULL. OF PEACE PROPOSALS 165, 167 (1986).
12 U.S. OFFICE OF SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, UNITED STATES NATIONAL SPACE POL-
ICY 1 (2006), available at http://www.ostp.gov/html/us%20National%2OSpace
%20Policy.pdf [hereinafter NATIONAL SPACE POLICY].
13 Id. at 1-2.
14 Id. at 2.
15 See Broad & Sanger, supra note 1, at 1. Michael Krepon notes that the Bush
administration had long argued that the world needed no space-weapons treaty
because no such arms existed and because the last tests were two decades ago;
however, "that argument is no longer operative." Id.
2007]
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limits the United States' ability to deny China the absolute free-
dom to pursue the same weapons.16 Space policy is no longer as
easy as maximizing options. The United States must now diag-
nose those areas where its national security interests are best
served by limiting military options.
This Article argues that the United States' primary goal must
be to protect its vast satellite assets. The significance of the
United States' satellites was showcased during the 1992 Persian
Gulf War, where they helped American troops dismantle the
fourth largest army in the world with less than 148 combat
deaths.' 7 Satellites and the information they provide have only
grown in importance since 1992. In 2001, the United States im-
plemented a comprehensive reform initiative to incorporate
new information technologies into all facets of its military opera-
tions."8 This initiative has used information technologies to ver-
tically and horizontally network America's armed forces,' 9 giving
the United States an unmatched advantage in any large-scale
conventional conflict.20
Protecting American satellites should take precedence over
preserving freedom of action in space, which the current Na-
tional Space Policy reveres.2 ' Unfettered action in space is only
a means to the end of national security. A networked military,
relying on real time satellite information, is a superior means of
pursuing national security because the United States' "depen-
dence on satellites for communications and the use of satellites
for intelligence gathering far outweigh any potential benefits of
placing power-projection systems in space. '22 A deployable Chi-
16 See Eric Hagt, China's ASAT Test: Strategic Response, CHINA SEC., Winter 2007,
at 31 [hereinafter China's ASAT Test]. Eric Hagt argues that Chinese participa-
tion in a space arms race is a fait accompli. Id.
17 Casualties in Principal Wars of the U.S., in WORLD ALMANAC & BOOK OF FACTS
166 (2003).
18 See generally DEP'T OF DEF., TRANSFORMATION PLANNING GUIDANCE (2003),
available at http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/libraryjfiles/document_129_Trans
formationPlanningGuidanceApril_2003_l.pdf.
19 See infra notes 61 to 65 and accompanying discussion on the integration of
information technologies into the American military.
20 See Walter P. Fairbanks, Implementing the Transformation Vision, JOINT FORCE
Q., Summer 2006, at 36-42; see a/soJohn Keller, FLIR Systems Multisensor Device to
Help Army Soldiers with Urban Warfare, MIL. & AEROSPACE ELECS., Nov. 2006, at
24-26.
21 See NATIONAL SPACE POLICY, supra note 12, at 1.
22 John Pike, The Paradox of Space Weapons, in STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL
PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE YEARBOOK 2003: ARMAMENTS, DISARMAMENT AND INTER-
NATIONAL SECURITY 433, 438 (2003) ("While in the future the loss of communica-
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nese ASAT system threatens the United States' decided space
advantage and thereby threatens its dominance in conventional
military capability. On a more fundamental level, the Chinese
ASAT test could stand as the ominous beginning of a space arms
race where the United States and China vie for military
supremacy in space. This eventuality is also a destabilizing sce-
nario that would undermine the United States' terrestrial mili-
tary dominance. By allowing all space assets to become viable
targets, the United States would be forced to engage in the
costly23  and technologically-daunting task of developing
counter-ASAT weapons. Consequently, this Article argues that
an ASAT treaty would best safeguard the United States' national
security interests by diplomatically securing its satellites.
This Article approaches the issue of an ASAT treaty from a
conservative perspective in order to show why an ASAT treaty
should appeal to liberals and conservatives alike. While liberal
beliefs have historically been more receptive to comprehensive
treaty regimes, 24 traditional conservative thought questions the
value of treaties and resists attempts to restrict national free-
dom.25 For example, Hank Cooper, the former director of Pres-
ident Ronald Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative and current
chairman of the missile defense advocacy group High Frontier,
said, "I hope the Chinese test will be a wake up call to people
... . I'd like to see us begin a serious anti-satellite program.
We've been leaning on this administration. This argument to
prevent the weaponization of space is really silly."'26 An ASAT
system also advances the conservative, and especially neo-con-
servative, goal of maintaining the United States conventional
military dominance. 27 Thus, for conservatives, the issue is not
tions and intelligence systems would be devastating, the absence of power
projection from space would not significantly inhibit U.S. Policy.").
23 See Broad & Sanger, supra note 1, at A3.
24 See, e.g., NAT'L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, FACT SHEET: NATIONAL SPACE POLICY
4-9 (1996) available at http://history.nasa.gov/appf2.pdf [hereinafter NATIONAL
SPACE POLICY 1996] (endorsing diplomatic solutions to international problems).
25 See Victoria Samson, The Skies Just Got More Dangerous, MINUTEMAN.ORG, Nov.
29, 2006, reprinted at Ctr. for Def. Info. Online, Dec. 11, 2006, http://wNv.cdi.
org/program/document.cfm?DocumentD=3749&StartRow=l &ListRows= 10&
appendURL=&Orderby=D.DateLastUpdated&ProgramID=68&from-page=index
.cfm (arguing that the 2006 Space Policy "contains a unilateralist and militaristic
bent that could prove quite dangerous").
26 See Teresa Hitchens, US-Sino Relations in Space: From "War of Words" to Cold
War in Space?, CHINA SEC., Winter 2007, at 20.
27 See Gordon & Cloud, supra note 7, at Al (suggesting that the administration
chose not to protest the Chinese ASAT test in order to maximize its military space
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simply resisting treaties; rather, the issue is whether resisting
treaties is as important as protecting the United States' satellite
assets. This Article argues that, even when approached from a
purely conservative national security perspective, an ASAT treaty
best safeguards the United States' national security.
Part I of this Article will place the January 11, 2007 ASAT test
within the context of China's grand strategy. The Article will
argue that the decision to launch an ASAT was the product of
numerous factors, including a desire for greater regional power,
a fear of possible exclusion from space, and a response to the
United States' missile defense policy.28 Part II discusses the
need to revise the 2006 National Space Policy in order to prop-
erly prioritize the United States' space interests so that satellite
protection takes precedence over operational freedom in space.
Part III describes the difficulties of a non-diplomatic solution to
the Chinese ASAT threat. It is difficult to hit an incoming ASAT
weapon before it hits the satellite because of the ASAT's quick
flight path and rapid speed.29 Also, the constraints of current
technology make it difficult to "harden" satellites against at-
tack.30 Consequently, all non-diplomatic solutions to the Chi-
nese ASAT problem fail to secure the United States' satellites.
Part IV argues that a diplomatic solution to the Chinese ASAT
threat best safeguards the United States' interests in space. The
United States and China stand at the brink of a space arms race
where each side may develop space weapons because it fears the
other country might develop such weapons. 1 A space weapons
options after the test); see also Ernest A. Young, Judicial Activism and Conservative
Politics, 73 U. COLO. L. REv. 1139, 1194 (2002) (citing IRVING KRISTOL, REFLEC-
TIONS OF A NEOCONSERVATIVE 75-77 (1983) (discussing the neo-conservative affin-
ity for proactive military action)). Neo-conservatives embrace a more proactive
foreign policy that does not accept the status quo of aggressive states acting
against the United States' interests. See STEFAN HALPER & JONATHAN CLARKE,
AMERICA ALONE: THE NEO-CONSERVATVES AND THE GLOBAL ORDER II (2005). Pro-
ponents of a neo-conservative foreign policy, like Paul Wolfowitz and Richard
Perle, argue that the United States should use its military to expand the rule of
democracy as a way to safeguard American interests. See Frank Walsh, Note, Syn-
chronizing Colombian Narcoterrorism Policy with the War on Terror: The Legality of Mili-
tary Deployment by the United States and the Organization of American States, 4 GEO. J.
L. & PUB. POL'Y 453, 454 (2006); see also Winston P. Nagan & Craig Hammer, The
New Bush National Security Doctrine and the Rule of Law, 22 BERKELEVJ. INT'L L. 375,
431-32 (2004) (discussing the neo-conservative desire to militarily change the
status quo when that state of affairs does not advance American interests).
28 See infra text accompanying notes 37-60.
29 See infra text accompanying notes 90-97.
30 See infra text accompanying notes 78-105.
31 See infra Part IV.
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race would further destabilize space policy as other space pow-
ers, like Russia, might feel the need to deploy their own space
weapons. 2 To break out of this cycle, both the United States
and China should sign a treaty that satisfies both of their foreign
policy goals. Such an ASAT treaty would not only safeguard the
United States' satellite assets but also preclude a looming arms
race.
3 3
I. CHINA'S DECISION TO TEST AN ASAT SYSTEM WAS
MOTIVATED BY A DESIRE TO ASYMMETRICALLY
THREATEN THE UNITED STATES MILITARY'S
DEPENDENCE ON SATELLITES AND INTEGRATED
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES
In order to understand what the ASAT system means for Sino-
American relations, the system must be considered within the
greater context of Chinese foreign policy. While Chinese offi-
cials have vehemently argued the peaceful intent of the Chinese
space program,34 the ASAT test vindicated the Department of
Defense's 2003 skepticism of China's sincerity:
Publicly, China opposes the militarization of space and seeks to
prevent or slow the development of U.S. anti-satellite ("ASAT")
systems and space-based missile defenses. Privately, however,
China's leaders probably view ASATs-and offensive counter-
space systems, in general-as well as space-based missile defense
as inevitabilities. 5
This Article now examines why China would pursue a public
policy of condemning space weapons while secretly pursuing
ASAT technologies.
32 See Pike, supra note 22, at 438-41 (discussing how a space arms race is inher-
ently destabilizing).
33 ContraJeff Kueter, The War in Space Has Already Begun, MARSHALL INST. POL'V
OUTLOOK, Oct. 2006, at 1-2, available at http://www.marshall.org/pdf/materi-
als/459.pdf (arguing that the space arms race has already begun).
34 See, e.g., Major General Chang Xianqi & Sui Junquin, Active Exploration and
Peaceful Use of Outer Space, CHINA SEC., Spring 2006.
35 DEP'T OF DEF., ANNUAL REPORT ON THE MILITARY POWER OF THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA 36 (2003), available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/mili-
tary/library/report/2003/20030730chinaex.pdf. This idea stems from the often
quoted "24 Character" strategy of Deng Xiaoping: "observe calmly; secure our
position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time; be good
at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership." See DEP'T OF DEF.,
ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: MILITARY POWER OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA 9 (2006) (stating that China's foreign policy "strategy suggests both a
short-term desire to downplay China's ambitions and a long-term strategy to
build up China's power to maximize options for the future").
2007] 765
766 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [72
A. CHINA'S MOTIVATION TO PURSUE AN ASAT SYSTEM
The reason for China's decision to test an ASAT system is
likely an amalgam of domestic and international forces that ulti-
mately led Beijing to find that the political calculus weighed in
favor of carrying out the test. Dissecting major policy decisions
like this is inherently difficult even in more transparent govern-
ments like the United States. For a closed society like China,
comprehensively divining the complex policy motivations be-
hind the ASAT launch is nearly impossible.3 6 There are, how-
ever, several individual factors that can be identified as leading
to China's decision to test its ASAT system.
First, China's decision to test an ASAT stemmed from its de-
sire to exert greater influence within East Asia generally37 and
over Taiwan specifically.3 8 American military dominance vis-I-vis
the Chinese military represents a challenge to both of these
goals. While Beijing was unwilling to accept the status quo of
36 See Joan Johnson-Freese, Strategic Communication with China: What Message
About Space?, CHINA SEC., Spring 2006, at 39 (discussing the lack of transparency
in Chinese political processes); Eric Hagt, Mutually Assured Vulnerabilities in Space,
CHINA SEC., Spring 2006, at 97.
37 See Pavel Kamennov, China's Military Policy: Where Taiwan Fits In, 34 FAR E.
AFF. 62, 62, 67 (2006) (stating that China's "national development strategy ... is
aimed at making China a great power by the middle of the 21st century that will
occupy a dominant position in the Asia-Pacific Region"); DEP'T OF DEF., ANNUAL
REPORT TO CONGRESS: MILITARY POWER OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 7
(2006) (citing China's "global aspirations"); Charles Snyder, CIA Director Warns
US of China Threat, TAIPEI TIMES, Feb. 8, 2002, at 1.
38 See INFO. OFFICE OF THE STATE COUNCIL (P.R.C.), CHINA'S NATIONAL DEFENSE
IN 2006 § I, 8 (2006), http://english.people.com.cn/whitepaper/defense2006.
html (stating that any suggestion of a movement towards Taiwanese indepen-
dence represents "a grave threat to China's sovereignty and territorial integrity,
as well as to peace and stability across the Taiwan Straits and in the Asia-Pacific
region as a whole"); Jim Yardley, China Denies "Taiwan" Law On Secession is a "War
Bill," N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2005, at A12 (describing China's 2005 law forbidding
the secession of Taiwan); INFO. OFFICE OF THE STATE COUNCIL (P.R.C.), CHINA'S
NATIONAL DEFENSE IN 2004 § II, 4 (2004), http://english.gov.cn/official/2005-
07 / 2 8/content_18078.htm ("Should the Taiwan authorities go so far as to make
a reckless attempt that constitutes a major incident of 'Taiwan independence,'
the Chinese people and armed forces will resolutely and thoroughly crush it at
any cost.");James H. Hughes, China's Ballistic Missile Threat, 27J. SOC. POL. ECON.
STUD. 3, 6 (2002). Hughes quoted Chinese PresidentJiang Zemin as saying that
China had to:
disclose, when appropriate, some information on strategic weap-
onry so that the U.S. will exercise some caution in decision making,
and be aware that it would have to pay a price if it decided to inter-
vene in a military conflict ... [t]he purpose is to prevent the U.S.
from being deeply involved [in] Taiwan.
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American military hegemony"9 after the American military's ef-
fectiveness was showcased in Operation Desert Storm,4" China
knew that it could not militarily challenge the United States
force-on-force. 4' Instead, Beijing sought out weaknesses in the
American military so China could fight an asymmetrical war. In
1998, China's Central Committee gave its highest priority to the
development of an ASAT4 2 and pursued several ASAT programs,
including the use of lasers to blind satellites,43 jamming and
electromagnetic pulses to disable electronics,44 and a "parasitic
satellite" kinetic-energy vehicle.45 In the end, China succeeded
in using a ballistic missile to hit a low-flying satellite.46 The test
of an ASAT system was thus partly a demonstration that China
had gained a new asymmetrical capability against America's
military.
Second, the ASAT test was a response to the perceived threat
that the United States might someday attempt to deny China
access to space.4 7 While space dominance, and by implication
the denial of space access to others, was implied in American
military publications in the late 1990s and early 2000s, 48 the
39 See DEP'T OF DEF., ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: MILITARY POWER OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 10 (2006) (quoting Deputy Political Commissar of
the People's Liberation Army Air Force Liu Yazhou as saying: "[W] hen a nation
grows strong enough, it practices hegemony. The sole purpose of power is to
pursue even greater power ... when a country begins to rise, it should first set
itself in an invincible position").
40 MATTHEW MOWTHORPE, THE MILITARIZATION AND WEAPONIZATION OF SPACE
167 (2004).
41 SeeJohnson-Freese, supra note 36, at 51.
42 See Paul Beaver, China Develops Anti-satellite Laser System, JANE'S DEF. WKLV.,
Dec. 2, 1998, at 18; Paul Richter, China May Seek Satellite Laser, Pentagon Warns,
L.A. TIMES, Nov. 28, 1998.
43 Stormy Weather: China and Space, ECONOMIST, Jan. 27, 2007, at 42.
44 Hughes, supra note 38, at 4.
45 James H. Hughes, The Current Status of China's Military Space Program, 27 J.
SOC. POL. ECON. STUD. 393, 405 (2002).
46 MOwTHORPE, supra note 40, at 104. The direct ascent missile technology in
the Chinese ASAT could have its roots in the Soviet Union's "co-orbital" method
of interception. Id.
47 Interview with Eric Hagt, Dir. of China Program at the World Sec. Inst., in
Arlington, Va. (Mar. 23, 2007) (notes on file with author).
48 SeeJohnson-Freese, supra note 36, at 48 (discussing Chinese perceptions of
American actions) (quotingU.S. AIR FORCE, DOCTRINE DOC. 2-2.1, COUNTERSPACE
OPERATIONS 9 (2004), available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/ser-
vicepubs/afdd2_2_1.pdf); U.S. SPACE COMMAND, VISION FOR 2020 5 (1997),
available at http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/usspac/visbook.pdf ("The
emerging synergy of space superiority with land, sea, and air superiority, will lead
to Full Spectrum Dominance."); U.S. AIR FORCE, TRANSFORMATION FLIGHT PLAN
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2006 National Space Policy explicitly made space access denial a
goal. 49 The Policy demands that the Secretary of Defense
"[d]evelop capabilities, plans, and options to .... if directed,
deny ... freedom of action [in space] to adversaries. ' 50 China
has invested heavily into satellite technologies over the past dec-
ade, launching thirty-nine satellites51 and spending between
$1.4 and $2.2 billion on its space program.52 With this greater
Chinese investment in space, the American threat of space de-
nial carries even more weight. The ASAT test, then, was partly a
result of Beijing's desire to tell Washington that China would
not accept American space hegemony.53 As Michael Krepon,
President Emeritus of the Henry L. Stimson Center, stated:
"[t]he Chinese are telling the Pentagon that the United States
does not own space. China's message was that 'two could play
the space weapons game, and we can play it dirtier than you."51
Finally, the Chinese ASAT test was also an attempt to show the
United States that Beijing could target any space-based compo-
nents of an American national ballistic missile defense (BMD)
system.55 Cooperation between the United States, Japan, and
D-4 (2003), available at http://www.af.mil/library/posture/
AFTRANSFLIGHTPLAN-2003.pdf (calling for the deployment of conven-
tional weapons in space).
49 NATIONAL SPACE POLICY, supra note 12, at 2, 4.
50 Id. In addition to the 2006 Space Policy, China was also concerned by (1)
the 2001 Rumsfeld Space Commission's conclusion that space would inevitably
become a battlefield and (2) the Schreiver war games conducted by the Air Force
in 2001, 2003, and 2005, where the United States fought a space war against a
fictional country threatening a small island neighbor about the size of Taiwan.
SeeJohnson-Freese, supra note 36, at 52. The thinly-veiled reference to China in
the Schreiver games was not lost on Beijing. Id. To China, these actions made it
seem that the United States was preparing for an inevitable space arms race
against China. Id. If space weaponization was inevitable, then it would be in
China's best interests to develop its own space weapons. Id.
51 See Hagt, supra note 36, at 87-92 (discussing China's increasing stake in
satellites).
52 See MARCIA S. SMITH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., Doc. No. RS21641, CHINA'S
SPACE PROGRAM: AN OvrNRVIEw 4 (2005).
53 Interview with Eric Hagt, supra note 47.
54 Interview with Michael Krepon, Co-Founder, Henry L. Stimson Ctr., in
Washington, D.C. (Mar. 20, 2007) (notes on file with author); see also Stormy
Weather: China and Space, supra note 43, at 7 ("China's aim is to signal to America
and its proteges in Asia-Taiwan and Japan especially-that it has ways of coun-
tering the space-based technology on which America's armed forces rely so
heavily.").
55 Interview with Eric Hagt, supra note 47; see also Zhang Hui, Space Weaponiza-
tion and Space Security: A Chinese Perspective, CHINA SEC., Spring 2006, at 26 ("China
is even more concerned about space-based BMD systems ....").
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India on missile defense threatens China because an integrated
regional missile defense system could neutralize China's nuclear
deterrent.56 But BMD does more than threaten China's strate-
gic concerns-China has incorporated short-range and interme-
diate-range ballistic missiles into its operational plans for a
conventional conflict to accomplish many of the goals that the
United States accomplishes with fighters, bombers, and cruise
missiles.5 7 As a relatively cheap and effective means of attacking
over-the-horizon targets, ballistic missiles are China's "preferred
method of power projection in the twenty-first century. ' 58
When viewed from this perspective, an American BMD system is
not just neutralizing China's strategic assets, but also its conven-
tional strike assets.
Regardless of the actual reason for the pursuit of an ASAT,
China's research into the system outpaced almost all estimates.
In early 2003, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency
testified that ASAT systems would not be available for ten
years.59 In 2004, political scientist Michael E. O'Hanlon under-
estimated the Chinese ASAT program when he posited that
"China might also have means to attack U.S. space assets, partic-
56 See Hagt, supra note 36, at 86; Hui, supra note 55, at 26 ("Even a limited
missile defense system could neutralize China's fewer than two dozen single-war-
head Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles that are capable of reaching the United
States.").
57 Hughes, supra note 38, at 1.
58 Paul Dodge, Circumventing Sea Power: Chinese Strategies to Deter U.S. Intervention
in Taiwan, 23 COMP. STRATEGY 391, 401 (2004). The People's Liberation Army's
(PLA) Second Artillery, in charge of China's ballistic missiles, views its ballistic
missiles as a "pocket of excellence." Id.; see also Hughes, supra note 38, at 4
("[China's] missiles can help achieve a form of blitzkrieg or lightning warfare,
striking faster and deeper than tanks of aircraft."); NAT'L INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL,
FOREIGN MISSILE DEVELOPMENTS AND THE BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT TO THE
UNITED STATES THROUGH 2015 9 (2001), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/nic/
bmthreat-2015.htm.
"Beijing's growing short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) force pro-
vides China with a military capability that avoids the political and
practical constraints associated with the use of nuclear-armed mis-
siles. The latest Chinese SRBMs provide a survivable and effective
conventional strike force and expand conventional ballistic missile
coverage." [Furthermore], China's leaders calculate that conven-
tionally armed ballistic missiles add a potent new dimension to Chi-
nese military capabilities, and they are committed to continue
fielding them at a rapid pace."
ld.
59 Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States, 108th Cong.
64 (2003) (statement of Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby, Director, Defense Intelli-
gence Agency).
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ularly lower-flying reconnaissance satellites, by 2010 or 2015. " 6o
The rapid rate of Chinese research, underestimated by the
American intelligence community, should serve as a warning to
American policy-makers: China has set its sights on asymmetrical
systems that can target vulnerabilities in the American military.
B. THE THREAT OF BALLISTIC MISSILES AND OTHER ASAT
SYSTEMS IS AN ESPECIALLY DANGEROUS ASYMMETRICAL WEAPON
AGAINST AMERICA'S CONVENTIONAL MILITARY SUPREMACY
Over the last twenty years, the American armed forces have
undergone a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) by incorpo-
rating new technologies into the traditional methods of war-
fare.6 ' The use of these new technologies has facilitated
unprecedented coordination at all levels by allowing for greater
vertical integration, allowing superior officers to communicate
with subordinates, and horizontal integration, allowing units to
communicate with other units across the battlefield.6 2 With bet-
ter coordination, each American unit is more versatile, more ef-
fective, and more deadly." It was this new way of fighting wars
that allowed for the spectacular successes of the American mili-
tary in Operation Desert Storm, Operation Enduring Freedom,
60 MICHAEL E. O'HANLON, NEITHER STAR WARS NOR SANCTUARY: CONSTRAINING
THE MILITARY USES OF SPACE 103 (2004).
61 WILLIAM S. COHEN, DEP'T OF DEF., ANNUAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND
THE CONGRESS 122 (1999) ("A Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) occurs when
a nation's military seizes an opportunity to transform its strategy, military doc-
trine, training, education, organization, equipment, operations, and tactics to
achieve decisive military results in fundamentally new ways."). Andrew Marshall,
head of the Net Assessment in the Pentagon, coined the term "RMA" in 1993 to
emphasize the importance of operational concepts and organizational adapta-
tions in turning technological advances into greater military effectiveness. See
James G. Lee, Counterspace Operations for Information Dominance, in BEYOND THE
PATHS OF HEAVEN: THE EMERGENCE OF SPACE POWER THOUGHT 249, 252-53
(Bruce M. DeBlois ed., 1999) (arguing that the origin of information dominance
began in the Soviet Union in the 1970's); Barry Watts, Book Review, JOINT FORCE
Q., Summer 2005, at 110.
62 Eugene Gholz, Patterson Sch. of Diplomacy & Int'l Commerce, Univ. of Ky.,
Paper Presented at the Meeting of the American Political Science Association:
America's Innovative Advantage: Systems Integration in the U.S. Defense Indus-
try (Aug. 2002).
63 MOWTHORPE, supra note 40, at 171.
Advances in a nation's technical capability mean that] you can go
after the targets that are the strategic center of gravity in the battle-
field, and you will win. It means that you do not have to have as
many tanks, ships or airplanes. It means that you can put together
a whole new theory of the way you fight wars.
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and the first few months of Operation Iraqi Freedom,6 4 and it is
this new way of fighting that has allowed the modern military to
largely dissipate Clausewitz's ubiquitous "fog of war."65
Satellites serve as the foundation upon which the modern
networked American military stands. 66  Communication be-
tween different elements of the military is relayed by satellites,
enabling the United States to "essentially fuse[ ] its land-based
conventional power projection capabilities with its space-based
communications, navigation and reconnaissance capabilities."67
The beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom is illustrative of the
central role satellites play in modern military operations. Satel-
lite communications permitted fewer friendly-fire deaths, rapid
precision air strikes, "unprecedented command and control" of
forces, and a tour de force from Special Operations Forces who
controlled large areas with limited resources. 68 Additionally, 68
percent of munitions used in the twenty-nine-day battle were
precision-guided weapons using satellite targeting-a stark
change in ordinance from the unguided "dumb" bombs that
had dominated the Air Force's arsenal for close to fifty years.69
Low-level targeting satellites allowed for an unprecedented 80
percent accuracy in air strikes.7 "
The Chinese ASAT threatens to destroy the critical links be-
tween American operational units. Coordination is so ingrained
in modern American tactics that a sudden loss of communica-
tion could leave the American military fighting a battle for
which it has not been trained. Because the United States no
longer maintains comprehensive backup land lines, a Chinese
64 See id. at 172; Peter N. Spotts, Alarm Over China's Arms Pursuit-In Space,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 20, 2006, at 2 ("U.S. military successes in the first
Iraq war, the Balkans, and the early stage of the current war in Iraq were not lost
on Chinese military planners, who noted the key role of U.S. spy and navigation
satellites in planning and precision bombing.").
65 CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 120 (Michael E. Howard & Peter Paret eds.,
1976) (1873) (referring to the "fog and friction" of war).
66 See DONALD RUMSFELD, DEP'T OF DEF., ANNUAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT
AND THE CONcGRESs 60-62 (2005); MOWTHORPE, supra note 40, at 172.
67 See Kueter, supra note 33, at 1.
68 See TRANSFORMATION FLIGHT PLAN, supra note 48, at 71-72.
69 See Kueter, supra note 33, at 1.
70 Bombs over Baghdad, NEWSWEEK: COMMEMORATIVE WAR EDITION, Spring/Sum-
mer 1991, at 66 ("The first wave of attacks on Iraq exhibited a phenomenon
virtually unheard of in modern warfare: almost nothing went wrong. The targets,
including communications centers, military headquarters, air-defense installa-
tions, Scud missile launchers and military air bases, were struck with accuracy that
military officials put as high as 80 percent.").
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ASAT could potentially sever the link between American con-
ventional forces and leave the American military disoriented,
uncoordinated, and fighting a war without real-time intelli-
gence. 7 ' Not only are satellites the crucial link in sustaining
America's RMA, but they are also extremely vulnerable to at-
tack.7 2 As described in Part III, infra, no technology exists to
make satellites durable enough to withstand an attack like the
kinetic energy kill vehicle that destroyed the FY-1C. The satel-
lites that have allowed for unprecedented American military ef-
fectiveness are also America's Achilles' heel: they are vulnerable
and, if attacked, threaten to bring down a seemingly unstop-
pable warrior.
II. THE 2006 NATIONAL SPACE POLICY DOES NOT
ADEQUATELY DEAL WITH THE CHINESE ASAT SYSTEM
BECAUSE IT VALUES OPERATIONAL FREEDOM OVER
PROTECTING AMERICA'S NETWORKED
SATELLITE SYSTEM
In August 2006, President George W. Bush authorized a new
National Space Policy (2006 Space Policy)." The new Space
Policy, the first update since President William Clinton issued
his Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-49 on September 14,
1996, unambiguously identifies America's primary objective in
space policy as the need to maintain operational autonomy:
"[f]reedom of action in space is as important to the United
States as air power and sea power. ' 74 The emphasis on freedom
of action is primarily expressed in the belief that the United
States "will oppose the development of new legal regimes or
other restrictions that seek to prohibit or limit U.S. access to or
use of space. 75 The 2006 Space Policy thus categorically rejects
diplomatic instruments in favor of the use of force (or threat of
the use of force) as the mechanism for change.76
7' See O'HANLON, supra note 60, at 99 ("China will also surely focus on trying to
neutralize U.S. space assets in any future such conflict; no prudent military plan-
ner could do anything else.").
72 See infra, Part III.
73 NATIONAL SPACE POLICY, supra note 12, at 1.
74 Id. at 1.
75 Id. at 1-2.
76 See Michael Krepon & Michael Katz-Hyman, The Responsibilities of Space Faring
Nations, HENRY L. STIMSON CTR., http://www.stimson.org/pub.cfm?id=340 (last
visited Nov. 9, 2007). The same authors also wrote that "[d]iplomacy certainly
has its limits, and is no substitute for military preparedness, but complete free-
dom of action can turn space into a shooting gallery to every nation's detriment."
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This rejection of international legal regimes contrasts starkly
with the Clinton administration's tempered pursuit of "freedom
of action in space."7 While the 2006 National Space Policy "op-
pose[s] the development of new legal regimes,"78 the 1996 Na-
tional Space Policy mandated international legal cooperation:
" [t] he United States will pursue and conduct international coop-
erative space-related activities that achieve scientific, foreign pol-
icy, economic, or national security benefits for the Nation."79
On a more fundamental level, the Clinton administration con-
ceptualized international space law in a completely different way
from the Bush administration. In the 1996 National Space Pol-
icy, freedom of action and legal regimes were not part of a zero-
sum game but rather could work together to advance national
security:
Consistent with treaty obligations, the United States will develop,
operate, and maintain space control capabilities to ensure free-
dom of action in space and, if directed, deny such freedom of
action to adversaries. These capabilities may also be enhanced
by diplomatic, legal, or military measures to preclude an adver-
sary's hostile use of space systems and services. The United
States will maintain and modernize space surveillance and associ-
ated battle management command, control, communications,
computers, and intelligence to effectively detect, track, catego-
rize, monitor, and characterize threats to U.S. and friendly space
systems and contribute to the protection of U.S. military
activities.8'
For the Clinton administration, then, international treaties
could secure freedom of action, such as continued satellite in-
tegrity and use.
The inherent flaw in the 2006 Space Policy is that it values a
means to an end more than the end. The need for operational
freedom in space as a means to safeguard national security has
become so institutionalized that other paths to national security
are rejected if they restrict operational freedom. The institu-
tionalization of a policy occurs when an organization fails to
keep its ultimate goal in mind, but rather only thinks of the
near-term, and in so doing, loses the forest for the trees. The
Michael Krepon & Michael Katz-Hyman, Irresponsible in Space, HENRY L. STIMSON
CTR., http://wiv.stimson.org/pub.cfm?ID=390 (last visited Nov. 9, 2007).
77 NATIONAL SPACE POLICY 1996, supra note 24, at 4.
78 NATIONAL SPACE POLICY, supra note 12, at 2.
79 NATIONAL SPACE POLICY 1996, supra note 24, at 4 (emphasis added).
80 Id. at 4.
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United States is correct when it says it will "take those actions
necessary to protect its space capabilities; respond to interfer-
ence; and deny, if necessary, adversaries the use of space capa-
bilities hostile to U.S. national interests.""1 But there are many
paths to protecting space capabilities, and denying adversaries
the use of hostile space capabilities, including the diplomatic
measures that the 2006 Space Policy categorically rejects. The
danger in conflating a nation's goal and a possible means to that
goal is that the means may become an institutionalized goal in
itself, whereby policy makers may begin to adopt strategies that
advance freedom of space action, but may not necessarily im-
prove national security.
In assessing how to craft a policy response to a potential Chi-
nese ASAT system, the United States should first decide on its
goal. Given the importance of satellites to the networked, sys-
tems-oriented American military, Washington's paramount goal
should be to protect America's satellite assets. Despite
America's unchallenged superiority in air and space, America's
satellites remain vulnerable to a variety of weapons.12 The best
way to achieve the goal of space security is to draft a National
Space Policy that permits the most effective defense of Ameri-
can satellites, whether it is by military, technological, diplomatic,
or a combination of means.8 " American national security is safe-
guarded just as well if the United States stops a Chinese ASAT
system at the negotiating table rather than on the battlefield.
III. NON-DIPLOMATIC SOLUTIONS: THE
SHORTCOMINGS OF DEVELOPING COUNTER-ASAT
WEAPONS AND "HARDENING" SATELLITES
There is little chance of adequately defending America's satel-
lites in the near-term by relying on technological innovations
81 NATIONAL SPACE POLICY, supra note 12, at 1; see also BENJAMIN S. LAMBETH,
MASTERING THE ULTIMATE HIGH GROUND: NEXT STEPS IN THE MILITARY USES OF
SPACE 105-06 (2003) (noting that each National Space Policy since 1958 has "ac-
knowledged that the nation's space capabilities will routinely support U.S. mili-
tary operations as feasible and appropriate").
82 Jon Howland, Foes See U.S. Satellite Dependence as Vulnerable Asymmetric Target,
JEWISH INST. FOR NAT'L SEC. AFFAIRS, Dec. 4, 2003, http://www.jinsa.org/articles/
articles. html/function/view/categoryid/ 1 333/documentid/2304/history/3,23
60,656,1333,2304.
83 See Responsibilities of Space Faring Nations, supra note 76, at 2 ("Since vulnera-
bility in space is so pervasive, we undermine space security whenever we close off
avenues that can help prevent actions damaging to our satellites.").
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that would either allow satellites to withstand an ASAT strike84
or that could intercept incoming ASAT weapons before they hit
American satellites.85 Even though many in the United States
would prefer a technological response to the Chinese ASAT be-
cause such a system would not rely on Chinese candor on arms
control,86 the technological reality is that the United States can-
not practically "hedge" against Chinese ASAT systems.8 7 This
Article will now explore the shortcomings of a non-diplomatic
solution. First, this Article will discuss the inability to deploy
counter-ASAT weapons that destroy incoming ASAT weapons. 8
Second, this article will discuss military plans to "harden" satel-
lites by making them more maneuverable, better armored, and
more replaceable.89
A. A BMD COULD NOT LIKELY STOP BALLISTIC MISSILE
ASAT SYSTEMS
A BMD could not likely be used to neutralize a ballistic missile
ASAT system in the near-term.9" As Richard Lehner of the Mis-
sile Defense Agency (MDA) describes, the inherent problem
"[I] s really the timing .... [I] f a missile is launched to destroy a
satellite there is an incredibly short response time with which to
try to intercept that missile."'" The current national missile de-
fense systems target missiles with trajectories stretching tens-of-
thousands of kilometers long, and reaching from Asia to North
America.9 2 An anti-ASAT interceptor must hit targets with tra-
jectories that are only several hundred kilometers long.9 3 The
84 See Sanger & Kahn, supra note 8, at A3.
85 E-mail from Richard Lehner, Missile Def. Agency/Pub. Affairs, to Frank M.
Walsh (Mar. 19, 2007, 2:30 EST) (on file with author) (stating that current BMD
technologies could not likely stop a ballistic missile ASAT).
86 See, e.g., Keuter, supra note 33, at 1; THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 40-42 (2006), available at http://www.
whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/nss2006.pdf [hereinafter NATIONAL SECURITY
STRATEGY].
87 See NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 86, at 42 (stating that the
United States "seeks to encourage China to make the right strategic choices for
its people, while we hedge against other possibilities").
88 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ALTERNATIVE FOR BOOST-PHASE MISSILE DEFENSE Xi
(2004) available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/56xx/doc5679/07-22-Missile
Defense.pdf.
89 See Sanger & Kahn, supra note 8, at A3.
90 See Lehner, supra note 85.
91 Id.
92 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 88, at 1.
93 See Lehner, supra note 85.
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most promising BMD technologies being pursued by the MDA
intercept the ballistic missile at either the boost phase, during
the ballistic missile's initial ascent, or the terminal phase, imme-
diately before the missile hits its target.94 Terminal phase de-
fenses would not work against ASAT weapons because an ASAT
has no terminal phase-it ends its flight in space." Boost phase
technologies like the Airborne Laser, which fires a concentrated
beam of light at ballistic missiles at altitudes below three hun-
dred miles,96 are limited by the need to have defensive assets in
position to respond to a launch within seconds. As Mr. Lehner
describes, boost phase defenses could potentially work if they
are "in exactly the right place at exactly the right time. ' 97 Given
these narrow constraints, it is highly unlikely that current BMD
technologies could neutralize a Chinese ASAT.
B. "HARDENING" SATELLITES AND BUILDING SATELLITES WITH
GREATER DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES WILL GIVE ONLY
MODERATE PROTECTION AGAINST
ASAT WEAPONS
The United States could research and develop technologies
that would "harden" satellites to the point where they could
evade or survive attacks.98 This approach requires a variety of
different mechanisms to be incorporated into new satellite de-
signs. First, satellites could be equipped with sensors to detect
incoming ballistic weapons and rockets so they can maneuver
out of the way of a kinetic kill vehicle.99 While this option would
likely require too much fuel to be practical for bigger satellites,
increased maneuverability could work against a rudimentary bal-
listic missile system like the current Chinese design. 100 Better
ASAT guidance and tracking systems, however, could neutralize
satellite maneuvering efforts by allowing an ASAT weapon to
change course as it approaches the targeted satellite.
94 Id.
95 See id.
96 Missile Def. Agency, Boost Phase Defense, http://vvv.mda.mil/mdalink/
html/boost.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2007).
97 Lehner, supra note 85.
98 See Sanger & Kahn, supra note 8, at A3.
99 See id.
100 See O'HANLON, supra note 60, at 128; The Henry L. Stimson Ctr., Adopting
Defensive Measures, http://vvw.stimson.org/space/?SN=WS20040412657 (last
visited Nov. 9, 2007).
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Alternatively, a backup system of replacement of satellites
could help the United States reestablish its network in the case
of a first strike. The capability to relaunch satellites is a unique
goal because it is more of a logistical problem of rapidly launch-
ing satellites and less of a technological problem of hardening
satellites against potentially awesome destructive power."1" Be-
cause it is virtually "impossible to harden satellites against direct
assaults by kinetic energy ASATs"'1 2 like the one China tested, a
replacement program may be the only way to guarantee contin-
ued satellite operations. This system would also provide addi-
tional benefits since it would allow the United States to deploy
replacements when the original satellites fail because of normal
maintenance failure.
Nevertheless, all of these hardening approaches are only mar-
ginal defenses against a determined ASAT attack. A more com-
plex ASAT, with better guidance and greater maneuverability,
could defeat these systems and once again expose American
satellites. But a non-diplomatic approach to the ASAT threat
fails on a more fundamental level: it ushers in a space arms
race.'0 3 If the United States deploys counter-ASAT weapons,
then China will develop better ASATs, and the United States will
in turn pursue better countermeasures.104 According to H.
Baker Spring of the Heritage Foundation, a conservative policy
institute, a potential space arms race would most likely run to
"billions or tens of billions of dollars a year, pretty much year in
and year out. °10 5 The result of this expensive endeavor, even if
the United States is successful, would ultimately be the status
quo of American satellite safety. A better policy would be to
pursue the goal of American satellite safety via a less expensive
and less risky path.
101 See Sanger & Kahn, supra note 8, at A3.
102 The Henry L. Stimson Ctr., supra note 100.
103 Stephanie C. Lieggi, Space Arms Race: China's ASAT Test a Wake-Up Call,
JAMES MARTIN CTR. FOR NONPROLIFERATION STUDIES, Jan. 24, 2007, http://
cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/070124.htm.
104 See Hui, supra note 55, at 26 (discussing the possibility of a space arms race
between China and the United States).
105 Broad, supra note 9, at WK3.
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IV. BREAKING OUT OF THE SECURITY DILEMMA: AN
ASAT TREATY BEST SAFEGUARDS AMERICAN NATIONAL
SECURITY BY PROTECTING AMERICAN SATELLITES
Given the importance of satellites to the American military
and the shortcomings of a military approach to the ASAT prob-
lem, the necessity for a diplomatic solution to the Chinese ASAT
is clear. Simply put, there is no other viable option for defend-
ing American satellites. A diplomatic solution to a Chinese
ASAT threat would serve American interests because it prevents
the deployment of an ASAT, avoids a costly space arms race,'0 6
and preserves international political capital." 7 The benefits of
an ASAT treaty would extend beyond protecting American satel-
lites; with a successful ASAT treaty, the United States could set
important space law precedent that would help institutionalize
America's terrestrial military dominance. As the 2001 Rumsfeld
Space Commission reported: "[i]n order to extend its deter-
rence concepts and defense capabilities to space, the U.S. will
require . . .engaging U.S. allies and friends, and the interna-
tional community, in a sustained effort to fashion appropriate
106 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 88, at ix; Chinas Anti-Satellite Test: A
New Arms Race in Space?, ECONOMIST, Jan. 27, 2007, at 51 (discussing how a space
arms race would be an inefficient outcome for all parties involved); Broad, supra
note 9, at WK3.
107 See Andreas Paulus, The War Against Iraq and the Future of International Law:
Hegemony or Pluralism?, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 691, 732 (2004). The political costs
associated with unilateralism reflect a growing recognition that international in-
stitutions could play an important role in defending democracies worldwide:
[T] he use of force without the clear and unequivocal support of
international law and institutions is costly in terms of so-called polit-
ical capital, for example, the costs of maintaining fragile "coalitions
of the willing" and enlisting international support. Thus, the legiti-
macy bestowed on military action by international institutions is
everything but negligible .... A United States abandoning multi-
lateralism will have a much harder time in winning support for the
implementation of anti-terrorism measures.
Id. Scholars like William Shawcross and John Norton Moore, both advocates of
the traditional neo-conservative goal of military action to support foreign democ-
racies, acknowledge the utility of working through the international system to
achieve its goals. See generally; WILLIAM SHAWCROSS, ALLIES: THE U.S., BRITAIN,
AND EUROPE IN THE WAR IN IRAQ (2004); John Norton Moore, Ending Terrorism in
Colombia, submitted in 148 CONG. REC. 56,860 (daily ed. July 12, 2002); Frank
Walsh, Synchronizing Colombian Narcoterrorism Policy with the War on Terror: The Legal-
ity of Military Deployment by the United States and the Organization of American States, 4
GEO. J.L. PUB. POL'Y 453, 453-54 (2006) (discussing the neo-conservative ap-
proach to foreign policy).
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'rules of the road' for space."10O The "rules of the road" encom-
passed in an ASAT treaty would help protect America's national
security by preventing the use of asymmetric attacks on
America's space infrastructure and by forcing potential enemies
to fight the hardened American terrestrial military instead of
America's vulnerable satellites.
This Article will now discuss the diplomatic response to the
Chinese ASAT threat by (1) showing how the potential space
arms race constitutes a "security dilemma" that could lead to a
sub-optimal policy if no ASAT treaty is brokered; (2) arguing
that an ASAT treaty banning the testing, deployment, and use of
ASATs could be reasonably verified; and (3) discussing provi-
sions that could safeguard America's operational space freedom
within an ASAT treaty.
A. THE "SECURITY DILEMMA" OF INCREASED RELIANCE ON
SATELLITE ASSETS AND POTENTIAL ASAT SYSTEMS
The ASAT problem is such a difficult policy problem because
both the United States and China have vested national security
interests in satellites, but neither side is ready to forego deploy-
ment of ASAT weaponry. Both nations would best be served by
preserving the status quo: no space weaponry, no ASATs, and
free access to space. However, because each nation does not
trust the other, both countries may start down the road to a
space arms race. This situation, where two nations pursue a sub-
optimal policy because they cannot cooperate on pursuing the
optimal policy, is known as a security dilemma.10 9
1. An ASAT Treaty and Preserving the Status Quo is the Optimal
Policy Because Both China and the United States Have a
Vested Interest in Protecting Satellites
For the United States, maintaining the status quo condition of
having no ASATs deployed is the optimal space policy. As de-
scribed supra, the United States has a vested interest in protect-
ing its satellites, and non-diplomatic solutions cannot protect
America's space assets. An ASAT treaty, on the other hand,
could prevent unrestricted space warfare and the indiscriminate
targeting of American satellites. The benefits to the United
108 REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO ASSESS UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY
SPACE POLICY 6, 12 (2001), available at http://globalsecurity.org/space/library/
report/200 1 /nssmo/fullreport.pdf.
109 See Hagt, supra note 36, at 94-96.
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States are not only military but economic as well, because the
United States has invested hundreds of millions of dollars into
its civilian and commercial satellites."0 These benefits, when
obtained via an ASAT treaty, would secure America's conven-
tional dominance at a fraction of the cost of a space arms
race.1 1' Thus, a policy of no ASAT deployment is America's op-
timal policy because it is the cheapest way to achieve the most
beneficial space policy.' 12
China's optimal space policy is also the status quo because the
current situation: (1) contains no deployed ASATs, and (2)
space access is not challenged. The lack of an operational
American ASAT benefits China because Beijing has invested
heavily in satellites over the past fifteen years.'1 3 In November
2000, China issued a White Paper on space policy saying: " [t] he
Chinese government attaches great importance to the signifi-
cant role of space activities in implementing the strategy of revi-
talizing the country .... The development of space activities is
encouraged and supported by the government as an integral
part of the state's comprehensive development strategy." '114 The
Chinese government followed up on this pledge with an ambi-
tious plan that launched thirty-nine satellites in the past eleven
years to give China the world's fourth largest satellite space pro-
gram. I I5 With such an extensive investment in space, China
stands to lose billions of dollars if it ever engaged in satellite
warfare with the United States. 1 6
11 See Major Elizabeth Seebode Waldrop, Integration of Military and Civilian
Space Assets: Legal and National Security Implications, 55 A.F. L. REv. 157, 163
(2004) (discussing the growing civilian and commercial investment in satellites).
Recognizing the importance of commercial satellites, Congress has passed several
laws encouraging private firms to invest in satellites. See Department of Defense
Appropriations Act 2003, Pub. L. 107-248, § 903, 115 Stat. 1519 (creating a loan-
guarantee program for commercial space transportation systems); SMITH, supra
note 52, at 7.
1I See Broad & Sanger, supra note 1, at 3.
112 SeeJoANJOHNSON-FREESE, U.S. AIR FORCE INST. FOR NAT'L SEC. STUDIES, OC-
CASIONAL PAPER No. 30, THE VAILITv OF U.S. ANTI-SATELLITE (ASAT) POLICY:
MOVING TOwARD SPACE CONTROL 30 (2000), available at http://www.usafa.af.mil/
df/inss/OCP/ocp30.pdf.
113 See Hagt, supra note 36, at 86-88.
114 THE STATE COUNCIL INFO. OFFICE (P.R.C.), CHINA'S SPACE ACTIVITIES § I, 3
http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2005-07/27/content-1 7656.htm.
115 See Hagt, supra note 36, at 87.
116 See id. at 87-88 (discussing China's rapid rate of satellite launches and the
recent investments in the world's largest micro-satellite industry park).
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Additionally, China should prefer the current policy situation
because China still has full access to space. The nightmare sce-
nario for China, in assessing the dangers of American advances
in space weaponry, would be a state of affairs where the United
States could deny China access to space. 17 Eric Hagt, Director
of the China Program at the Center for Defense Information,
argues that "China has no conceivable interest in blindly pursu-
ing an all-out space weapons program .... Such a move would
• * . launch China into a costly space race with the United
States."1 i By adopting a treaty regime that protects satellites
from destruction, Beijing could cement its presence in space by
immunizing its satellites from attack.
For both the United States and China, a space policy free of
ASATs and space weapons best satisfies each nation's goals. In
practice, however, Washington and Beijing are both moving
down the path towards ASAT systems and the weaponization of
space. The failure to cooperate on a mutually-beneficial space
policy is the result of a disconnect between the Chinese and
American governments: each country is distrustful of the other
and has consequently shut down meaningful negotiations.
2. Miscommunication and a "Dialogue of the Deaf' Has Impaired
Cooperative Action in Sino-American Space Policy
The lack of communication on arms control between the
United States and China is a product of a fundamental lack of
trust between the two countries on space policy. The distrust
has two major causes: (1) the inherently dual-use nature of satel-
lites and (2) a series of controversies in the past two decades.
First, many satellites are neither definitively military nor civilian,
but can serve both purposes simultaneously-approximately
ninety-five percent of space technology has both civil and mili-
tary applications."' This "dual-use" nature of satellites compli-
cates negotiations on space policy because it is very difficult to
determine whether a satellite launch is part of a military or civil-
ian endeavor. 120 In a cognate of the perennial glass half-full or
half-empty question, American and Chinese policy makers are
often called upon to classify a satellite that could be either mili-
117 Interview with Eric Hagt, supra note 47.
118 China's ASAT Test, supra note 16, at 38 (stating that the ASAT test was a
result of "China's observations and subsequent conclusions [that] have engen-
dered a fundamental response: we cannot accept this state of affairs").
119 SeeJohnson-Freese, supra note 36, at 39.
120 Id.
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tary or civilian and divine the intent behind the satellite's de-
ployment. Since the nature of a given satellite is difficult to
determine without intrusive inspections, both sides have as-
sumed that the other's use of satellites has some sinister military
use. 121
The second reason for the lack of Sino-American communica-
tion on space policy stems from a series of controversies begin-
ning in the 1990s. In April 1998, the New York Times published a
story alleging that two companies, Loral Space and Communica-
tions and Hughes Electronics, had given China confidential
technical information on how to improve Chinese nuclear mis-
siles. 122 After a Justice Department investigation, Loral and
Hughes agreed to settle the case after accepting fines of $6 mil-
lion and $20 million, respectively. 123 Following the Department
ofJustice investigation, the House of Representatives established
the Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/
Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China
(Cox Commission), which recommended a number of addi-
tional regulations to prevent another intentional transfer of
technical space knowledge to foreign powers. 124 The Cox Com-
mission's report engendered much mistrust of China,125 and
since the report's publication, the Department of State has not
granted any export licenses for China-bound satellite launch ve-
hicles. 126 As a result of these two factors and general reserva-
tions about China for its opaque government 127  and
questionable human rights record,' 28 the United States has been
reluctant to trust China. 29 For its own part, China does not
121 Id. at 39-40.
122 Jeff Gerth & Raymond Bonner, Companies Are Investigated for Aid to China on
Rockets, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 1998, at Al.
123 CARL E. BEHRENS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., H.R. Doc. No. IB93062, SPACE
LAUNCH VEHICLES: GOVERNMENT ACrIVITIES, COMMERCIAL COMPETITION, AND SAT-
ELLITE EXPORTS 12-13 (2006).
124 See id.
125 SeeJohnson-Freese, supra note 36, at 44.
126 See SMITH, supra note 52, at 5; see also, Guo Xiaobing, Blockade on China or the
United States? U.S. Regulatory Policies on Space Technology Exports to China, CHINA
SEC., Winter 2006, at 73 (discussing the adverse economic consequences Ameri-
can businesses have suffered from not being able to trade with China).
127 SeeJohnson-Freese, supra note 36, at 39.
128 See BEHRENS, supra note 123, at 11. After the Tianamen Square uprising,
Congress prohibited the export of U.S. built satellites to China unless the Presi-
dent reported that either (1) China's human rights record had improved or (2)
it was in the national interest of the United States. Id.
129 Interview with Eric Hagt, supra note 47.
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trust the United States to maintain a peaceful posture in
space. 30
As a result of this mistrust, there has been no real communica-
tion on disarmament or arms control in the last decade. The
United Nations Conference on Disarmament (CD) has been
deadlocked for close to a decade, 3 ' partially because the United
States has opposed any negotiations on Prevention of an Arms
Race in Outer Space (PAROS) 1 3 2 and China has opposed any
negotiation on a fissile material cut-off treaty in the absence of
negotiations on PAROS. 133 In 1998, the CD appointed special
ad hoc committees to try and break this deadlock in talks, but to
date these committees have made no progress. 134 There is cur-
rently no real likelihood that either China or the United States
will change its entrenched bargaining position without a major
new policy initiative. 13 5 Neither side trusts the other, and, as a
result, neither side is willing to engage in strategic communica-
tions over how to resolve the Chinese ASAT threat.
3. Breaking Out of the Security Dilemma
Simple game theory provides an adequate model of the Sino-
American ASAT treaty policy problem. 1 6 In what has been
13o See supra note 47 and accompanying discussion. China places particular em-
phasis on public statements from the American government. Interview with Eric
Hagt, supra note 47. The 2006 National Space Policy's emphasis on possible
"space denial" limits Beijing's faith in America's peaceful aspirations.
131 See Michael Krepon, The Conference on Disarmament: Means of Rejuvenation,
ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Dec. 2006, at 18.
132 The Bush administration has argued against any international treaties limit-
ing space weapons on the grounds that the current legal environment is suffi-
cient and now there is no space arms race so a treaty would be premature. See
Marc Kaufman & Dafna Linzer, China Criticized for Anti-Satellite Missile Test, WASH.
POST, Jan. 19, 2007, at Al.
133 SHARON SQUASSONI, ANDREW DEMKEE & JILL MARIE PARILLO, CONG. RE-
SEARCH SERV., BANNING FISSILE MATERIAL PRODUCTION FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS:
PROSPECTS FOR A TREATY (FMCI) 4 (2006), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/
crs/nuke/RS22474.pdf.
134 Id.
135 See Interview with Eric Hagt, supra note 47.
136 SeeJames McConvill, Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance: Rising
Above the "Pay-for-Performance" Principle, 43 Am. Bus. L.J. 413, 413 (2006) ("Game
theory encompasses an interdisciplinary approach . . . to the study of the behav-
ior of humans. A 'game' in this context is a scientific metaphor for a wide range
of human interactions between two, or more than two, persons, such persons
possessing opposing (or at least mixed) motives.").
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called the Prisoner's Dilemma, 137 self-interested actors have
been shown to choose mutually disadvantageous policies be-
cause they could not effectively collaborate with the other actors
in the scenario. 3 8 Figure 1 applies the Prisoner's Dilemma to
the decision to deploy an ASAT. In this "security dilemma,"'39
the United States' choices are listed on the x-axis and China's
choices are listed along the y-axis. The "payoffs" for each coun-
try are thus a function of both countries' choices; the payoffs for
each combination of policy choices are given in the grid.
Choices for the United States
Choices for No ASAT/ Deploying an
China Space Weapons ASAT/Space
Weapons
No ASAT/ China: 5 China: -10
Space Weapons USA: 5 USA: 10
Deploying an China: 10 China: -5
ASAT/Space USA: -10 USA: -5
Weapons
The numbers given in the grid represent the author's approx-
imate quantitative valuations of the resulting policy situation.
The top-left square, where both the United States and China
refrain from deploying ASATs, is the optimal choice140 in the
game because the United States and China would both benefit
from protected satellites and continued space access. The utility
of this outcome is arbitrarily assigned as five. The bottom-right
square represents a space arms race where both countries de-
ploy ASAT system. This game assumes that the space weapons
race ends in a stalemate where both countries develop ASATs.
The expensive endeavor accounts for the negative five utility for
both sides: each side is worse off than the status quo because,
137 See id. at 427 n.44 ("The prisoner's dilemma is defined as a situation in
which the noncooperative pursuit of self-interest by two parties makes them both
worse off."); see generally WILLIAM POUNDSTONE, PRISONERS' DILEMMA (1992); AL-
BERT W. TUCKER, CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE THEORIES OF GAMES (1950).
138 See McConvill, supra note 136, at 47 n.44.
139 Hagt, supra note 36, at 94.
140 See David D. Haddock et. al., An Ordinary Economic Rationale for Extraordinary
Legal Sanctions, 78 CALIF. L. REv. 1, 15 n.42 (1990). The top left policy is the
optimal choice because it represents best outcome that both sides would likely
agree upon. The top-left square is also Pareto efficient, that is, no party can be
made better off without making another party worse off. Id.
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after a billion dollar expenditure, 4 ' each country's satellites are
still in danger of being attacked. Finally, the top-right and bot-
tom-left squares represent situations where one country deploys
an ASAT and the other country does not. The country that
deployed the ASAT has uncontested space control and derives a
utility of positive ten. The country that is caught without an
ASAT derives a utility of negative ten because that country is at
the mercy of the ASAT-deploying country.
This security dilemma paradigm is, like all models, an over-
simplication of Sino-American space relations. For example, the
United States and China do not engage in a single policy con-
frontation but rather make hundreds of policy decisions each
day. That is, the United States and China play the "game" every
day. This repeated play can affect the decision-making process
in the game by making cooperative play either more or less
likely.'4 2 Also, there are countless externalities involved in the
policy-making process that could never be adequately integrated
into a model. Nevertheless, the security dilemma is a useful par-
adigm because it isolates the fundamental policy options for
Sino-American space policy. Additionally, the values attributed
to each payoff can be altered and the security dilemma still func-
tions as long as the structure of the game remains unchanged.
Uncontested space control is valued highest, cooperative action
is valued second, a space arms race is valued third, and being at
the mercy of an ASAT-wielding power is last.143 Thus, the secur-
ity dilemma is a simplified yet effective approach for policy-mak-
ers attempting to craft America's response to the Chinese ASAT.
This set-up is called a dilemma because, even though the
United States and China would be better off refraining from
141 See Broad & Sanger, supra note 1, at 3.
142 See Annapurna Valluri, Learning and Cooperation in Sequential Games, 14 ADAP-
TIVE BEHAVIOR 195, 202-203 (2006) (discussing how players learn cooperative
behavior in sequential play of Prisoner's Dilemma-type games). Cooperative play
may become more likely because a failure to cooperate carries with it the extra
cost of undermining future cooperation. Id. Incorporating this cost of future
diplomatic tension into the Prisoner's Dilemma game would mean lowering the
payoff for the ASAT-deployer in situations where one player deploys and one
does not. Cooperative play may become less likely if a previous iteration of the
game had one party not cooperate while the other did. Id. at 205. For example,
if the United States sees the Chinese ASAT test as an untrustworthy violation of its
calls for space disarmament then the United States would be less likely to cooper-
ate in the future.
143 This "sensitivity analysis" lies at the core of the Prisoner's Dilemma's utility.
The actual values attributed to each policy decision are arbitrary, but their rela-
tive desirability is well-founded.
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starting an arms race, pictured in the top-left square, both coun-
tries will likely choose to begin the arms race when acting out of
self-interest. The decision-making process, for the United
States, proceeds as follows: (1) if China were to deploy an ASAT,
then it would be in America's best interest to also deploy an
ASAT (moving its utility from negative 10 to negative 5); (2) if
China were to refrain from deploying an ASAT, then it would
again be in America's best interest to deploy an ASAT (moving
utility from five to ten). The decision-making process for China
is identical: in every situation, both countries choose to deploy
ASAT systems.
The key to breaking out of this security dilemma is coopera-
tive play. If both the United States and China could cooperate
in making their decisions, they could agree to follow policies
that would give them each utilities of positive five instead of neg-
ative five. In the real world, this cooperative play means that
both countries could reliably agree to refrain from engaging in
a costly arms race. This kind of cooperation is difficult, how-
ever, for the reasons discussed earlier in Part IV(A) (2)-specifi-
cally, that the United States and China have not engaged in
meaningful space policy talks in years. Neither Washington nor
Beijing will likely unilaterally refrain from deploying an ASAT;
rather, any hope for cooperation lies in an ASAT treaty that
bans signatories from aggressively targeting satellites.
China has actively advocated for a comprehensive treaty re-
gime that limits the weaponization of space,' 44 and Chinese offi-
cials have routinely suggested space weapons bans at the United
Nations Conference on Disarmament.'45 Beijing would likely be
willing to engage the United States if Washington was to seri-
ously address the issue of banning ASAT weapons. The onus is
thus on the United States to take China up on its offer to negoti-
ate. The 2006 National Security Strategy correctly argues that
the United States "seeks to encourage China to make the right
strategic choices for its people[.]' ' 46 With respect to American
space policy, this means that Washington should encourage Beij-
ing to refrain from deploying ASAT weapons and to avoid a
costly space arms race. The best way to do this is through a
144 See Hui, supra note 55, at 28 (discussing China's desire for a space weapons
ban); Spotts, supra note 64, at 2; Broad & Sanger, supra note 1, at 1.
145 See BEHRENS, supra note 123, at 5; James Martin Ctr. For Nonproliferation
Studies, China: Arms Control Proposals and Statements, http://www.cns.miis.
edu/research/space/china/arms.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2007).
146 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 86, at 42.
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treaty that allows both China and the United States to coopera-
tively break out of the space weapons security dilemma.1
4 7
B. SOLVING THE VERIFICATION DILEMMA: AN ASAT TREATY
COULD BE VERIFIED IF ESTABLISHED BEFORE FURTHER
ASAT TESTING
The biggest policy hurdle for an ASAT treaty is the issue of
verification: that is, whether verification provisions could give
"timely warning, with appropriate confidence, of violations of
formal provisions of a treaty limiting ASAT acts, capabilities and
preparations. '  Critics of an ASAT treaty uniformly claim that
such an instrument would be an unverifiable leap of faith that
rogue nations could covertly ignore with impunity."' 9 Satellites
are inherently "dual-use" because the same satellite can be used
for both peaceful and military purposes without any detectable
alteration. 150 Dating back to the Reagan administration, critics
147 SeeJohn J. Klein, Space Power: An Ill-Suited Space Strategy, AIR & SPACE POWER
J., Fall 2006, at 79.
148 RICHARD L. GARWIN, ASAT TREATY VERIFICATION, ARMS CONTROL VERIFICA-
TION: THE TECHNOLOGIES THAT MAKE IT POSSIBLE 208 (Kosta Tsipis et al. eds.,
1986).
149 Stormy Weather: China and Space, supra note 43, at 7 (expressing concern
about the ability to verify a Chinese weapons program); accord Baker Spring, As-
sessing "Rights" Under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, HERITAGE FOUND., Mar.
23, 2006, at 2, available at http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/
h1930.cfm (discussing North Korea's withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation
Treaty and Iran's defiance of the Treaty).
150 See O'HANLON, supra note 60, at 121 ("[B]ans on space weaponry ... would
be generally unverifiable .... This is a fact of physics, not of policy, and cannot
be changed."). Additionally, non-ASAT technologies can be covertly retrofitted
to serve in an ASAT role. The issue of converting treaty-compliant assets into
treaty-banned material has been a central issue in nuclear proliferation. See
Globalization 101.org, The Carnegie Endowment for Int'l Peace, Nuclear Non-
proliferation, http://vww.globalizationI 01.org/index.php?file=issue&passI=
subs&id=339H5 (last visited Nov. 10, 2007). For example, the two "proliferation-
resistant" light-water nuclear reactors produce material that can be easily en-
riched into weapons grade plutonium at small, covert enrichment plants. HAR-
MON W. HUBBARD, PLUTONIUM FROM LIGHT WATER REACTORS AS NUCLEAR WEAPON
MATERIAL 1, 6-10 (2003), http://www.npec-web.org/Essays/2003-04-01Hubbard.
pdf. Similarly, in the ASAT field, ballistic missile interceptors and radio jamming
systems could both be converted into an ASAT role at covert plants. See
O'HANLON, supra note 60, at 120-21. Another type of verification problem in-
volves the difficulties in observing mobile or small facilities. Ert C. Toth, Soviet
Radar Sile-Arms Issue Symbol Facility Dramatizes Problems of Verifying Treaty Compli-
ance, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1985, at 1. This type of verification problem was central
to growing dissatisfaction with the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). See,
e.g., Brian Heap, Scientists Against Biological Weapons, SCI., Nov. 16, 2001, at 1417.
Iraq was able to conceal the extent of its biological weapons programs in the face
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have uniformly dismissed ASAT treaties as "effectively unverifi-
able" and therefore not worth pursuing.' 15  A renewed push for
an ASAT treaty in response to the Chinese test must thus ad-
dress how party-states could verify compliance with the treaty.
An ASAT verification regime would break new ground in
space law because none of the existing space treaties contain the
type of formalized verification procedures codified in other
arms control treaties. 152 For example, the Outer Space Treaty,
which bans nuclear weapons in space and restricts the use of
celestial bodies to "peaceful purposes,' 1 53 has no real verifica-
tion procedure. 154 Articles X and XII of the Outer Space Treaty
allow a party-state that suspects a violation of the treaty to re-
quest a "consultation," but there is no duty on the accused state
to take any action. 155 Article 15 of the Moon Treaty contains a
of intrusive UN investigations, and rumors persist about a continued Russian pro-
gram. See KIAss, supra note 11, at 226.
15, See THOMAS A. SUMMERS, AIR UNIV., AU/ACSC/172/2000-04, How is U.S.
SPACE POWER JEOPARDIZED BY AN ADVERSARY'S EXPLOITATION, TECHNOLIGICAL DE-
VELOPMENTS, EMPLOYMENT AND ENGAGEMENT OF LASER ANTISATELLITE WEAPONS?
20 (2000), available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/acsc/00-172.pdf.
152 Thomas Graham, Jr., The Essentiality of Effective Verification: From Sputnik to the
Space Station, PROBLEMS OF POST-COMMUNISM, Mar./Apr. 2006, at 19.
153 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies art. IV,
Jan. 27, 1967, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space
Treaty].
154 Du Shuhua, The Outer Space and the Moon Treaties (1976, 1979), in VERIFICA-
TION OF CURRENT DISARMAMENT AND ARMS LIMITATIONS AGREEMENTS: WAYS,
MEANS, AND PRACTICES 123, 123 (Serge Sur ed., 1991).
155 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 153, arts. X, XII. Article X reads:
In order to promote international co-operation in the exploration
and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bod-
ies, in conformity with the purposes of this Treaty, the States Parties
to the Treaty shall consider on a basis of equality any requests by
other States Parties to the Treaty to be afforded an opportunity to
observe the flight of space objects launched by those States. The
nature of such an opportunity for observation and the conditions
under which it could be afforded shall be determined by agree-
ment between the States concerned.
Id. art. X.
Article XII reads:
All stations, installations, equipment and space vehicles on the
moon and other celestial bodies shall be open to representatives of
other States Parties to the Treaty on a basis of reciprocity. Such
representatives shall give reasonable advance notice of a projected
visit, in order that appropriate consultations may be held and that
maximum precautions may be taken to assure safety and to avoid
interference with normal operations in the facility to be visited.
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similar empty verification provision where state parties "may re-
quest consultations" if they believe there has been a treaty viola-
tion."' This type of toothless verification offers little guidance
to those who desire effective ASAT verification. Consequently,
there is a virtual blank slate in devising how an ASAT treaty's
verification procedures would effectively advance the cause of
arms control. This Article approaches the issue of drafting ver-
ification procedures with a two-step approach: (1) first, identify-
ing verifiable and effective treaty goals that would build
confidence in an ASAT ban, and (2) arguing that a treaty should
be negotiated as soon as possible because the verifiability of an
ASAT treaty diminishes with time.
1. Banning the Testing, Deployment, and Use of ASATs: A
Verifiable and Effective Way to Protect American Satellites
The first step in creating a verifiable treaty is setting up verifia-
ble and effective treaty goals. For an ASAT treaty, this means
identifying verifiable treaty provisions that effectively preclude
the targeting of satellites.'5 7 There is an inherent tension in this
process: provisions that are more effective in precluding the de-
ployment of ASATs tend to be more difficult to verify. For ex-
ample, a total ban on any research, development, testing,
deployment, or use of ASAT technologies would effectively stop
an ASAT system. Such a comprehensive ban, however, would be
virtually impossible to verify because the United States could not
reasonably monitor all research and development in all Chinese
laboratories, nor is it likely that Beijing would allow such com-
prehensive investigations by American investigators. The diffi-
culty in constructing an arms control treaty is deciding at which
point in the production chain of a new weapon the treaty
should stop a nation's actions: at the initial research stages,
when a country starts to develop prototypes; when a country be-
gins testing the weapons system; when a country deploys a new
weapons system; or when a country uses a weapon against an
enemy. A treaty that stops action too early in this chain is unver-
Id. art. XII.
156 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Ce-
lestial Bodies, opened for signature Dec. 18, 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter
Moon Treaty].
157 For a detailed statistical analysis of various verification regimes, see gener-
ally RUDOLF AVENHAUS & MORTON JOHN CANTY, COMPLIANCE QUANTIFIED: INTRO-
DUCTION TO DATA VERIFICATION (1996).
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ifiable, while a treaty that stops action too late in the chain is not
effective in precluding destabilizing weapons systems.
A realistic ASAT ban would prohibit the testing, deployment,
and use of ASATs because this type of ban would effectively stop
the development of ASATs in a way that party-states could verify.
The three major draft ASAT treaties158 all agree that a treaty re-
gime should stop the creation of an ASAT at the testing stage
because it is at that "crucial point" where ASAT systems can be
stopped in an effective and verifiable manner.'59 Stopping
ASATs at the testing stage is effective because, without field tests,
an ASAT system cannot be relied upon as a weapons system.' 60
Theoretical simulations can only moderately model the real
world, and in order to deploy an effective ASAT system, a coun-
try must test the weapon against satellites.' 6 ' If an ASAT treaty
bans the testing of ASATs, then it interdicts the creation of an
ASAT system long before that ASAT is deployed or used. 6 2 This
kind of advanced notice of a country's progress in the field of
ASAT weaponry will allow non-violating countries to respond to
the diplomatic transgression.16 Thus, this type of ASAT ban
would effectively prevent an ASAT system.' 6 4
Banning ASAT activity at the testing, deployment, and use
stages is verifiable. Using satellites and other remote monitor-
158 The three major draft ASAT treaties, the 1983 Union of Concerned Scien-
tists draft, the 1983 Soviet Treaty Banning the Use of Force in Space, and the
1984 G6ttingen treaty, all ban the testing, deployment, and use of ASATs. See Dr.
Kurt Gottfried et al., Union of Concerned Scientists, A Draft Treaty Limiting
Anti-Satellite Weapons arts. I-I, http://www.ucsusa.org/global-security/space-
weapons/a-draft-treaty-limiting-asat-weapons.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2007)
(stating, "[e]ach Party undertakes not to test such weapons in space or against
space objects"); Draft Treaty on the Prohibition of the Use of Force in Outer
Space and from Space Against the Earth, art. 2, U.N. GAOR, 38th Sess., U.N.
Doc. A/38/194 (Aug. 23, 1983); Horst Fischer, The Military Use of Space and the
International Legal System, in STRATEGIC DEFENSES AND THE FUTURE OF THE ARMS
RACE 204, 210 (John Holdren &Joseph Rotblat eds., 1987) (discussing the 1984
G6ttingen draft treaty requiring signatories "not to develop and test or to deploy
in outer space, in the atmosphere or on earth any weapons or weapon systems
which serve this purpose").
159 See Scheffran, supra note 11, at 168.
160 See id.
161 See, e.g., Missile Defense Test Fails, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2002, at A34 (describ-
ing the difficulties testing American missile defense interceptors based on com-
puter simulations).
162 See Schreffran, supra note 11, at 167-68.
163 See id.
164 See id. at 168.
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ing devices known as national technical means (NTM),' 165 it
would be "relatively easy" to detect the testing, deployment, or
actual use of ASAT technologies. 166 NTM was the mainstay of
arms control verification during much of the Cold War' 6 7 and
was fundamental to the verification regimes in the Anti-Ballistic
Missile (ABM) Treaty,'68 the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
(INF),' 69 and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). 70
The immediate detection of the January 11, 2007 Chinese ASAT
test showcased how effectively American intelligence could de-
tect ASAT tests; indeed, the United States also detected the two
previous tests of the Chinese SC-19 ASAT weapon. 17  The
United States can also likely detect any deployments of ASAT
weapons by using reconnaissance satellites.1 72 In fact, America's
ability to track China's deployment of SC-19 mobile launchers
before the January test is a testament to the prowess of Ameri-
can reconnaissance efforts.17 Finally, the United States can de-
tect the actual use of ASATs by identifying the destruction of a
known satellite. 74 In sum, the United States currently has the
NTM to reliably detect when other countries test, deploy, or use
ASAT technologies.
An ASAT treaty could rely on other verification mechanisms
aside from NTM. First, on-site inspections could give investigat-
ing countries valuable information on facilities not observable
165 See Waldrop, supra 110, at 160.
166 KRAss, supra note 11, at 103 (describing how the testing of ASAT missiles "is
observable by Soviet national technical means, so a ban on the testing of such
devices would be relatively easy to verify").
167 See Captain Michael R. Hoversten, U.S. National Security and Government Reg-
ulation of Commercial Remote Sensing From Outer Space, 50 A.F. L. REv. 253, 258
(2001); Major Robert A. Ramey, Armed Conflict on the Final Frontier: The Law of War
in Space, 48 A.F. L. REv. 1, 102 (2000).
168 Treaty Between the United States of American and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, U.S.-
U.S.S.R., art. XII, May 26, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 3435, 944 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter
ABM Treaty].
169 Treaty on Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Mis-
siles, U.S.-U.S.S.R., art. XII, Dec. 8, 1987, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-11.
170 Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, U.S.-
U.S.S.R.,July 31, 1991, S. Treaty Doc. No. 102-20; Graham, supra note 152, at 18.
171 See Gordon & Cloud, supra note 7, at Al.
172 See generally VERIFICATION OF CURRENT DISARMAMENT AND ARMS LIMITATION
AGREEMENTS: WAyS, MEANS AND PRACTICES (Serge Sur ed., 1991) (describing the
use of satellite reconnaissance to verify various arms control agreements).
173 See Gordon & Cloud, supra note 7, at Al.
174 See id. (describing the tracing of space debris resulting from the January 11,
2007 destruction of the SC-19 satellite).
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by NTM.175 While countries may be reluctant to allow intrusive
on-site inspections of classified space-research laboratories, in-
spection concerns may be alleviated if an ASAT treaty estab-
lished a formalized inspection regime similar to the regime set
up in the 1987 INF Treaty.176 The Soviet Union proposed this
kind of an independent ASAT inspectorate in March 1987.177
Under the Soviet plan, the international inspectorate would sta-
tion permanent observers at all space launch facilities. 17 The
utility of on-site inspections in the ASAT context is questionable,
however, because ASATs can be launched from mobile launch-
ers that can evade inspectors. 179 But even if on-site inspections
might be better suited to large-scale weapons systems that are
stationary in nature, the inspections might nevertheless have a
place in ASAT verification as a guard against new ASAT technol-
ogies like highly-concentrated lasers that require substantial en-
ergy.18 0 Alternatively, countries could supplement NTM with a
less intrusive consultation regime. Similar to the mechanisms
described in the Outer Space Treaty' 8' and the Moon Treaty,18 2
party-states to an ASAT treaty could agree to discuss any per-
ceived violations of the treaty. Consultation adds little confi-
dence to a verification procedure, however, because
consultations are largely dependent on the good will of the
party-states to the treaty. 183 With this in mind, NTM remains the
best means for verifying potential violations of an ASAT treaty.
175 See Graham, supra note 152, at 18-20.
176 Id. at 19. The intrusive on-site inspection mechanism was used in the INF,
the START, the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty, and the Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC). See id.
177 Shuhua, supra note 154, at 129.
178 See id.
179 See Walter Pincus, Panel Seeks Intelligence Culpability, WASH. POST, Apr. 2,
2005, at A8 (discussing the difficulties on-site inspectors had in disproving the
rumor of mobile biological weapons labs in Iraq).
180 Stormy Weather: China and Space, supra note 43, at 7 (discussing the use of
lasers to "blind" satellites); GARIWN, supra note 148, at 214 (describing how on-site
inspections could hedge against new ASAT technologies).
181 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 153, arts. X, XII.
182 See Moon Treaty, supra note 156, art. XV.
183 See Shuhua, supra note 154, at 126. The consultation procedure is so "insuf-
ficient, incomplete, and ineffective" because it relies on good will between coun-
tries who mistrust each other so much that they are devising a formalized
verification procedure. Id. Put another way, proponents of consultation argue
the solution to helping two countries who do not trust each other is to rely on a
verification mechanism that requires them to trust each other.
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2. Time Is of the Essence: Operationalizing the ASAT Verification
Regime
The ability to verify ASAT technology deteriorates with every
successful ASAT test because ASAT technology is most observa-
ble at the testing stage.8 4 NTM can detect missile tests that hit
or pass near satellites, so monitoring ASAT development at this
point is relatively easy. 185 However, once an ASAT "weapon is
developed and deployed[,] its small size and non-distinctive de-
ployment mode" would make verification of a ban impossible. 186
The need for an ASAT treaty is time sensitive: the longer the
United States and China wait to negotiate a treaty, the less relia-
ble the treaty will be. 87 The January 11, 2007 Chinese test, the
Soviet tests in the 1970s, and the American ASAT tests in the
1980s have all shown a rudimentary ability to use ASATs.18 8 An
ASAT treaty is needed now before any further ASAT tests move
weapons development from the testing to deployment stage.
An ASAT treaty can be reasonably verified.'8 9 The United
States should not categorically reject an ASAT treaty simply be-
cause Washington cannot monitor all aspects of the Chinese sat-
ellite program. Instead, given the potential value of a
diplomatic solution to the Chinese ASAT threat, the United
States should consider what measures could be taken to provide
reasonable assurances of Chinese treaty compliance. During the
Cold War, President Ronald Reagan announced that the United
States would "trust, but verify" Russian arms control compli-
ance.19 In the ASAT context, trust seems to be hard to come
by. 9 ' Luckily, NTM can verify compliance in the meantime.




188 See Broad & Sanger, supra note 1, at Al.
189 See Scheffran, supra note 11, at 167. Scheffran argues that the level of ap-
propriate verification should be a function of the "importance of a treaty provi-
sion and the risk of undetected cheating." Id. In the ASAT context, this means
that the importance of protecting American satellites and the likelihood of China
covertly violating the treaty are the relevant criteria for determining the appropri-
ate level. As discussed earlier, the protection of American satellites should take
paramount importance, and the Chinese have repeatedly expressed their good
faith desire to limit space weapons.
190 Arms Control Verification: Don't Trust, Don't Verify, ECONOMIST, Sept. 4, 2004,
at 77.
191 See supra notes 119-135 and accompanying discussion.
20071 793
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
C. OVERCOMING THE RESTRICTIONS ON OPERATIONAL
FREEDOM: AN ASAT/SPACE WEAPONS TREATY COULD PRESERVE
FUTURE POLICY OPTIONS BY INCORPORATING A 25-YEAR REVIEW
DATE AND A UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL PROVISION
A common argument against signing an ASAT/Space Weap-
ons Treaty is that doing so would hamstring possible American
responses to unforeseen future threats. 92 This argument has
merit since the United States cannot with certainty predict what
threats it will face in fifty or a hundred years.193 For example,
China is currently deploying space observation satellites that
give it a new "significant reconnaissance capability."' 94 Despite
these common criticisms, an ASAT treaty could be crafted in a
way that would allow for future operational freedom.
19 5
First, an ASAT treaty could follow the example of the 1970
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and
include a self-review clause that would allow for a reevaluation of
the treaty in twenty-five years.' 96 Under the NPT:
Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a con-
ference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall
continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an addi-
tional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a
majority of the Parties to the Treaty. 19 7
The decision to subject the Non-Proliferation treaty to a com-
prehensive review was a result of a compromise at the negotiat-
ing table1 98 and the realization that "the treaty was not perfect
and that its provisions might not stand the test of time."' 99
Similarly, a potential ASAT treaty should incorporate a twenty-
five year review so the signatories could reassess whether the
192 See O'HANLON, supra note 60, at 121; LAMBETH, supra note 81, at 119-20.
193 See Current and Projected National Security Threats, supra note 59, at 17.
194 MOWrHORPE, supra note 40, at 95.
195 See discussion supra Part III.a.ii.
196 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons art. 10, 2, July 1,
1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 (hereinafter NPT).
1q7 Id.
198 GLENN T. SEABORG & BENJAMIN S. LOEB, STEMMING THE TIDE: ARMS CON-
TROL IN THE JOHNSON YEARS 355-58 (1987); Burrus M. Carnahan, Note, Protecting
Nuclear Facilities from Military Attack: Prospects After the Gulf War, 86 AM. J. INT'L L.
524, 537-38 (1992).
199 Jean du Preez, Half Full or Half Empty? Realizing the Promise of the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Dec. 2006, http://www.armscon-
trol.org/act/2006-12/DuPreez.asp; accord SEABORG & LOEB, supra note 198, at
381 (arguing that the twenty-five year bar was a result of the smaller nations'
reluctance to sign a long-term treaty).
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treaty had fulfilled its goals. 2"0 For the United States, this means
that in twenty-five years, Washington could determine whether
its interests were best being served by safeguarding its satellites
and resisting the weaponization of space. If no other country
had deployed space assets threatening America's terrestrial mili-
tary hegemony, then continued reliance on the treaty would be
appropriate. If, however, other nations had begun to field inno-
vative and potentially destabilizing weapons, then the United
States could find that withdrawal from an ASAT treaty would be
in its best interests. 20 1 With the inclusion of a twenty-five year
horizon, an ASAT/Space Weapons ban effectively codifies the
status quo in space power for review at a future date. For the
United States, the current terrestrial and space superpower, pre-
serving the status quo power balance equates to preserving
American dominance.2 °2
A second way to preserve future operational freedom would
be to incorporate a standard withdrawal provision into the
treaty. Generally, withdrawal provisions allow party-states to
withdraw in response to "extraordinary events related to the sub-
ject matter" after giving other members notice of their intent to
withdraw. 20 3 For example, the NPT allows for withdrawal with
three months notice 20 4 and the ABM treaty allows for withdrawal
with six months notice.20 5 Functionally, an ASAT treaty with a
withdrawal provision would preserve the status quo of no ASAT
weapons while giving party-states the ability to respond to
changes in circumstances that threaten the status quo. More im-
portantly, the chances that China could covertly test and deploy
an effective ASAT are slim because of America's intelligence ca-
200 See SEABORG & LOEB, supra note 198, at 381.
201 O'HANLON, supra note 60, at 112. O'Hanlon argues that some limited
ASAT accords or treaty bans would help preserve American interests. Id. at
111-12.
202 See Pike, supra note 22, at 438 (discussing how America's strategic goals are
best advanced without the potentially destabilizing deployment of space
weapons).
203 E.g., ABM Treaty, supra note 168, art. XV.
204 NPT, supra note 196, art. X.
205 ABM treaty, supra note 168, art. XV. Only two countries have withdrawn
from international arms control treaties: North Korea withdrew from the NPT
and the United States from the ABM treaty. See Three Decades of North Korea's Nu-
clear Program; Promises, Promises (While Building the Bomb), N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20 1994,
at 44 (describing North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT); David E. Sanger, Bush
Issues Directive Describing Policy on Antimissile Defenses, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2003, at
A21 (describing the United States' withdrawal from the ABM treaty).
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pacity.2 The United States detected the SC-19's previous
launches and knew about the January 11, 2007 test before the
launch. °7 America's verification capability would only improve
under a treaty regime that allowed for greater access.
V. CONCLUSION: AN ASAT/SPACE WEAPONS BAN
SERVES AS A MICROCOSM FOR
SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
The policy problems associated with the Chinese ASAT test
are symptomatic of more systemic problems in Sino-American
relations.2 °8 Samuel P. Huntington, a noted international rela-
tions scholar, has argued that the "increasingly antagonistic rela-
tions" between the United States, the current superpower, and
China, the world's rising superpower, are part of the inherent
friction in the shifting of global power.20 9 Other political scien-
tists have argued that the state of Sino-American relations is part
of inevitable real politik 210 or the beginning of a new Cold
War.2 1' Regardless of the cause of the rift between the United
States and China, American policy-makers must now decide how
to respond to the Chinese ASAT test amidst poor relations.
There are two basic possibilities: (1) the United States could as-
sume that relations will continue to deteriorate so America
should pursue military technologies to confront an inevitable
enemy, or (2) the United States could decide that a new Cold
War is not a fait accompli and that it should attempt to find
cooperative solutions where possible. An ASAT treaty that serves
206 See supra text accompanying notes 171-74.
207 Gordon & Cloud, supra note 7, at Al.
208 Interview with Eric Hagt, supra note 47.
209 SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF
WORLD ORDER 218-38 (1996) (predicting the rise of "Chinese hegemony").
210 Randall Peerenboom, The Fire-Breathing Dragon and the Cute, Cuddly Panda:
The Implication of China's Rise for Developing Countries, Human Rights, and Geopolitical
Stability, 7 CHI. J. INT'L L. 17, 44 (2006).
The Cold War is over. At least, the first Cold War is over. If there is
going to be a new Cold War with China, political ideology and cul-
tural issues are not going to be the main sources of contention.
The conflict will be due to realpolitik concerns over national secur-
ity and economic interests.
Id.
211 See DANIEL A. SHARP, LIVING WITH CHINA: U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 9, 10 (Ezra F. Vogel ed., 1997) (warning that in the next
century the United States "might well find itself in a new and destructive cold
war, but this time with China as adversary").
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the strategic needs of both the United States and China could
be the first step in following the latter option.
The ASAT security dilemma is a microcosm of Sino-American
relations as a whole. Just as the United States and China would
be better off pursuing a cooperative ASAT treaty instead of a
costly arms race, the two countries would also be better off pur-
suing cooperative national security policies instead of an antago-
nistic zero-sum game."' The major impediments to breaking
out of this bigger security dilemma are the same impediments to
cooperative action in the ASAT context: the United States and
China must communicate and trust each other.2" 3 Both are dif-
ficult. But maybe the first steps in a fundamental change in
Sino-American relations could begin with a single space treaty-
perhaps protecting the satellites that are vital to both countries
could be the beginning of a recognition of Beijing's and Wash-
ington's similarities.
Reengaging China on the issue of ASAT weapons would re-
present a breakthrough in Sino-American relations. This kind
of diplomatic coup is not unlike President Ronald Reagan's call
for nuclear abolition at the 1985 Reykjavik Summit with Soviet
General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev,214 an unprecedented
move that shocked the world and a number of Reagan's advi-
sors.2 15 While negotiations on nuclear abolition broke down af-
ter Reagan refused to concede on BMD, Reagan's maverick
diplomacy set the stage for future diplomatic engagement with
the Soviet Union. 2 6 As Reagan's Secretary of State, George P.
Shultz, explained, "the world was not ready for Ronald Reagan's
boldness. What happened at Reykjavik seemed almost too much
212 Interview with Eric Hagt, supra note 47. Cooperative action would also al-
low for greater economic integration and freer markets. See Peter K. Yu et al.,
China and the WTO: Progress, Perils, and Prospects, 17 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1, 2 (2003)
(describing the potential benefits of incorporating China's billion person popula-
tion into the global economy).
213 Interview with Eric Hagt, supra note 47.
214 Richard N. Lebow &Janice Grosstein, Reagan and the Russians: Foreign Policy,
THE ATL. MONTHLY, Feb. 1994, at 35 (describing Gorbachev's engagement at
Reykjavik).
215 See George P. Shultz, The Ultimate Summit, TIME, May 10, 1993, at 50; e.g.,
Ken Adelman, The Real Reagan, WALL ST. J., Oct. 5, 1999, at A26 (discussing the
significance of the Reykjavik summit).
216 Daniel Deudney & G. John Ikenberry, Who Won the Cold War?, FOREIGN
POL'Y, Summer 1992, at 123 ("But Reagan's anomalous anti-nuclearism provided
the crucial signal to Gorbachev that bold initiatives would be reciprocated rather
than exploited. Reagan's anti-nuclearism was more important than his adminis-
tration's military buildup in catalyzing the end of the Cold War.").
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for people to absorb, precisely because it was outside the bounds
of conventional wisdom. . . .We were .. .contemplating the
notion of a world without nuclear weapons.121 7 The time for
"boldness" and thinking "outside the bounds of conventional
wisdom" in the field of arms control may have come once again,
but this time in the context of ASAT abolition.
The 2006 National Space Policy's valuation of unfettered
space freedom as paramount must be reconsidered. By de-
manding that the United States have absolute freedom to pur-
sue weapons platforms in space, the President is undermining
his ability to stop China from pursuing these same weapons. Na-
tional security demands that we structure the militarization of
space into the paradigm that most favors the United States; in
essence, we must limit those weapons systems that hurt us the
most.
An ASAT system is such a weapon. The United States should
neutralize that threat, even if it means signing a treaty that limits
"its rights, capabilities, and freedom of action in space. '"218
There are numerous domestic political hurdles that must be
cleared before an ASAT weapons ban could ever be
presented,219 and there is a very real possibility that China would
not agree to any treaty the United States would put forward,220
but the benefits from such an accord warrant at least trying the
diplomatic route. America's armed forces will continue to rely
upon a heavily integrated information infrastructure, and it is
our government's duty to protect that infrastructure. To that
217 Id.
218 NATIONAL SPACE POLICY, supra note 12, 2.
219 The reality is that actually getting such a treaty passed would be a daunting
endeavor. As Michael Krepon explains, "it will take awhile for there to be a politi-
cal environment where 65-68 senators will agree to something that limits Ameri-
can flexibility in space." Interview with Michael Krepon, supra note 54. For this
reason, Krepon has proposed a "Code of Conduct" to set the "rules of the road"
with respect to each nation's space activities. See The Henry L. Stimson Ctr.,
Code of Conduct for Space (Feb. 2007), http://wv.stimson.org/?SN=WS2007
02131214; A new arms race in space? China's anti-satellite test, ECONOMIST, Jan. 27,
2007, at 5 (endorsing Krepon's Code of Conduct).
220 See Gordon & Cloud, supra note 7, at Al.
It is a bit of arms-control mythology that there is always a deal to be
made .... For years, the Chinese military has been writing about
how to cripple a superpower that relies on high-tech capabilities
like satellites. They have been patiently developing this capability.
I don't see why they would trade it away.
Id. (quoting Peter A. Rodman, former assistant in the Department of Defense Of-
fice of the Assistant Secretary of Defense).
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end, the United States must attempt to neutralize the Chinese
ASAT by both diplomatic and military means. America should
at least attempt to forge a diplomatic shield to complement the
military armor upon which the nation currently relies.
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